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The present study examined whether wording changes in a self-report anxiety scale for 
children were better able to distinguish anxious from non-anxious children than 
traditional wording. Furthermore, the study explored whether phrasing the items as 
either stimulus or consequences (outcomes) of events, would give a better 
assessment of fear and anxiety in children and adolescents. The four questionnaires 
were administered to an anxiety-disordered group and a non-anxious group of children 
aged from 6 to 15 years. Anxious children reported that they thought more about 
negative outcomes than non-anxious children. However, there were no differences in 
scores between the two groups using stimulus items. All children regarded negative 
physical consequences as aversive. However, anxious children reported thinking more 
frequently about negative physical outcomes than did non-anxious children. All 
children also thought about negative social outcomes. However, anxiety-disordered 
children rated negative social outcomes as more aversive than did non- anxious 
children. None of the four measures discriminated between the different anxiety 
disorders. Implications for children’s self-report data on anxiety are discussed.  
 
Self report measures of children’s anxiety are widely used in both clinical and research 
settings. However, existing self- report measures of children’s anxiety have had difficulty in 
consistently distinguishing anxious children from those with other forms of psychopathology 
and in distinguishing between the childhood anxiety disorders (Bell-Dolan, Last & Strauss, 
1990; Hodges, 1990; Hoehn-Saric, Maisami & Wiegand, 1987; Last, 1991; Mattison & 
Bagnato, 1987; Mattison, Bagnato & Brubaker, 1988; Perrin & Last, 1992; Strauss, Last, 
Hersen & Kazdin, 1988). 
 
One possible explanation for the lack of discriminant validity in existing child anxiety 
measures could be the fact that they are primarily based on adult measures of anxiety. Thus 
these measures are based on an assumption that chjldren’s conceptions of anxiety and their 
experience of anxiety are the same as those of adults, and, further, that children will report 
anxiety in a similar manner to adults. 
 
Children’s understanding of language has been shown to influence their responses to a self-
report measure of worry (Campbell, Rapee & Spence, 2001). In this study it was shown that 
adults answered how much they worried about negative outcomes at an equivalent level to 
how often they thought about the negative outcome. Adults seem, therefore, to equate the 
concept of the amount of worrying with the frequency with which they think of a particular 
outcome. The rating of the level of aversiveness of the negative outcomes depended on 
whether the negative outcome was of a physical or social nature. Children’s answers to the 
different response formats and questions concerning negative outcomes, however, showed a 
more complicated picture. Children under 10 years rated the negative physical outcome items 
similarly when asked their amount of worry and the aversiveness of the outcome. That is, they 
did not distinguish between the words worry and bad. For example, they rated that they 
worried a lot about being burnt and considered that it would be bad if they were burnt. They 
however did not equate the words worry and think. They answered they worried a lot about 
being burnt but did not think about it. Young people over 10 years answered that the negative 
physical outcomes were more aversive than the amount of worry they reported about the 
outcome. That is, they thought being burnt was bad but they didn’t worry about it. However, 
they reported they still thought about the outcomes less than they reported worrying about it, 
similar to the younger children and unlike adults. 
 
If younger children equate the concept of worry with the aversiveness of the event, then 
children would unrealistically report a high degree of worry concerning all items relating to 
potentially negative events, irrespective of the frequency with which they actually thought 
about the event. If this is the case, all children are likely to rate aversive physical outcomes as 
bad, irrespective of any clinical-presenting emotional or behavioural problem. Thus any 
differences between diagnosed anxious and non-anxious children would be masked. The 
wording of the questions therefore could be crucial in distinguishing between anxious and 
non-anxious children. 
 
Furthermore, the lack of discriminant validity in self-report measures of anxiety could be due 
to the fact that most self-report measures have used stimuli and not consequences 
(outcomes) of events, which may give a better assessment of fear and anxiety in children and 
adolescents. It has been shown previously that children, similiar to adults, organize worries 
about feared outcomes along the lines of two broad factors corresponding to physical and 
social threat (Campbell & Rapee, 1994). 
 
The present study therefore investigated whether wording changes from the usual fear or 
worry wording, if replaced with aversive wording (“How bad would it be?”) and frequency of 
thought wording (“How often do you think about?”) would be able to differentiate between 
anxious and non-anxious children. It was hypothesized that the physical and social subscales 
would elicit different patterns of responses which would distinguish anxious children from non-
anxious children. On the physical scale it was predicted that all children, whether anxious or 
not, would regard aversive physical outcomes as bad and thus these items would not 
discriminate between anxious and non-anxious children. For example, it was hypothesized 
that all children will rate dying, breaking an arm or a leg or being burnt as aversive. However it 
was hypothesized that anxious children would think significantly more than non-anxious 
children. This is because anxiety-disordered children are hypothesized to have maladaptive 
idiosyncratic schemas which dominate their information processing. That is, they show an 
exaggerated perception of threat which would result in higher scores on the negative physical 
outcomes frequency of thought measure than non-anxious children. For the negative social 
outcomes it was proposed that all children, whether anxious or not, would think about 
negative social outcomes (Campbell et al., 2001). However, it was predicted that anxious 
children would consider negative social outcomes as more aversive than non-anxious 
children, as they would exaggerate the cost of the unpleasant social outcomes more than 
non-anxious children. That is, anxious children would rate being lonely, being criticized and 
looking silly as being worse than non-anxious children. 
 
It was predicted that children diagnosed with Separation Anxiety Disorder will think about 
negative physical outcomes significantly more than children diagnosed with Social Phobia. It 
was expected that Socially Phobic children, on the other hand, will consider negative social 
outcomes as significantly more aversive than children diagnosed with Separation Anxiety 
Disorder. It was further hypothesized that children diagnosed with Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder will both think about negative physical outcomes, the same as children with 
Separation Anxiety Disorder, while also rating negative social outcomes as highly aversive, 
the same as Socially Phobic children. 
 
As well as wording differences, it is theoretically important to investigate whether stimulus or 
outcome measures, as well as different wording, will distinguish between anxious and non-
anxious children. It was hypothesized that the outcome questionnaire items, when using the 
frequency of thought format, would distinguish between anxious and non-anxious children, 
whereas the stimulus questionnaire would not, as they have failed to do so previously, even 
with the proposed change to frequency of thought and aversiveness wording. 
Method  
 
Participants and Procedure  
The participants were 164 school children aged from 6 to15 years. Two groups of subjects 
were recruited: an anxiety-disordered group (N=82) and a non-clinical control group (N=82). 
Subjects in the anxiety-disordered group were matched by age and gender with children who 
were not diagnosed with an anxiety disorder. There were 54 males and 28 females in each 
group, with the mean age being 9.9 years (S.D.=2.2) for both groups. The children in the 
anxiety group were either self-referred to the Child Anxiety Project at Macquarie University, 
Sydney, or the University of Queensland, Brisbane, in response to the projects’ publicity, or 
referred by school counselors. Exclusion criteria of mental retardation or physical disability 
were used. 
 
The anxious children were diagnosed by one the several clinical psychologists who were 
experienced in the area of anxiety disorders, using a modified version of the Anxiety 
Disorders Interview Schedule for Children-Parent and Child versions (ADIS-P & ADIS-C, 
Silverman & Nelles, 1988) adapted to cover DSM-IV diagnostic criteria. The diagnosis was 
made for the Macquarie University participants based on the psychologist’s clinical judgment 
after considering data from both the child and parent interviews. The diagnosis was made for 
the University of Queensland participants based on parent interview only. Resources did not 
permit the assessment of reliability of clinical diagnosis in the sample. Children were selected 
into the anxious group if their principal Axis 1 diagnosis of DSM-IV was either Separation 
Anxiety Disorder, Generalised Anxiety Disorder, Social Phobia, Specific Phobia or Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder. Twenty-five children had a principal diagnosis of Separation Disorder, 
29 were socially phobic, 18 were diagnosed with Generalised Anxiety Disorder, 6 with 
Specific Phobia and 4 with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder. There were 13 males and 12 
females with a mean age of 10.1 years (S.D.=2.3) in the Separation Anxiety Disorder group. 
In the Social Phobic group there were 24 males and 5 females who had a mean age of 10.2 
years (S.D.=2.2). In the Generalised Anxiety Disorder group there were 12 males and 6 
females with a mean age of 9.3 years (S.D.=2.2) and in the Specific Phobia/Obsessive 
Compulsive group there were 5 males and 5 females with mean age of 9.9 (S.D.=2.2). A one-
way ANOVA showed there were no significant differences between the anxiety groups, 
F(3,78)=0.67, n.s. A chi-square test showed that there were also no significant gender 
differences, X2(3)=6.94, n.s. across groups. Thirty-eight of the anxious children were 
diagnosed with one anxiety disorder only, 6 with one anxiety disorder and dysthymia, 28 with 
two anxiety disorders, 7 with 3 anxiety disorders and 3 with 2 anxiety disorders and 
dysthymia.  
 
The non-anxious children were recruited from a school sample of similar SES to the anxious 
sample and were selected as matches by age and gender to the clinically anxious children. 
Two schools, one high school and one primary school, agreed to participate. Teachers were 
asked to nominate children in their class who were neither anxious nor aggressive. As Barrett, 
Rapee, Dadds, & Ryan (1996) have shown, aggressive children perceive threat in the 
environment to a similar extent as anxious children. Parents of nominated children were 
contacted by letter. Those who agreed to participate were interviewed by a psychologist about 
their children using the Anxiety Disorder Interview Schedule (ADIS-P). If no anxiety disorder 
was present in the child and the parent gave written permission, the child was included in the 
sample. All non-clinical children were enrolled in regular classrooms in Queensland. 
 
All children completed the self-report measures, the four versions of the CAWS and the 
RCMAS (except for 6 children in the anxious group) in counterbalanced order. There were no 
significant differences found by order of the measures, Pillais F(20, 632)=0.701, n.s. 
 
Measures  
 
The Child and Adolescent Worry Scale (CAWS).  
 
The Child and Adolescent Worry Scale (CAWS, Campbell & Rapee, 1994) is a 20-item scale 
of potential negative outcomes generated by children. The instructions ask children to indicate 
how much they worry about each item on a three-point Likert scale (0 = “none” to 2 = ‘‘a  
lot”) giving a scoring range from 0 to 40. There are 9 items in the physical scale and 11 items 
in the social scale. The two scales possess high internal consistency with coefficients ranging 
from .92 to .84 for the 2-factor scales and .89 for the total score (Campbell & Rapee, 1994). 
They are highly reliable over a one week interval (0.90 for the physical scale and 0.84 for the 
social scale) and are moderately to strongly reliable over a three-month interval (0.82 for the 
physical scale and 0.71 for the social scale). 
 
The CAWS was modified in the present study to produce two versions. The items remained 
the same but the wording of the question and the responses were changed. One wording was 
“How often do you think about?” with responses of 2-Everday, I =Sometimes and 0=Never, 
and the second wording was ‘‘How bad would it be if?” with responses 2=Very Bad, I =Quite 
Bad and 0= Not All That Bad. Another parallel scale was developed using stimulus items. As 
the FSSC-R contains some outcome items, it was decided to construct a scale of entirely 
stimulus items. These stimulus items were matched with the outcome items. For example the 
outcome item “being laughed at” was matched with a stimulus item of “singing a song in front 
of friends”. The outcome item “being burnt” was matched with the stimulus item of “fire”, 
“being left out” with “not being invited to a birthday party” and “being killed in war” with “war”. 
The stimulus scale also had two versions with the items remaining the same but the wording 
and response format changed. The wording was the same as for the outcome scales. 
 
The Revised Children’s Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS)  
 
The Revised Children’s Manifest Anxiety Scale was developed as a counterpart to  
the adult-oriented Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (Reynolds & Richmond, 1978). It is also 
known as “What I Think and Feel”. It is a 37-item measure of chronic trait anxiety. Of the 37 
items, 28 measure anxiety and the remaining 9 tap social desirability in responding (a lie 
scale). Children respond to each item on the scale in a yes-no format by circling the 
appropriate response to such statements as “I am afraid of a lot of things” and “I worry a lot of 
the time”. All items are negatively worded except for the lie scale e.g., “I am always kind.” 
 
Internal consistency coefficients ranging from .56 to .80 across 11 age groups for the 3-factor 
scales and above .80 for the total score has e been reported (Reynolds & Richmond, 1985). 
Test-retest coefficients range from .68 (9 months) to .98 (3 weeks) (Reynolds & Richmond. 
1985; Witt, Heffer & Pfeiffer, 1990). Concurrent and construct validity have been established 
through correlations of .85 with the Trait scale of the STAIC (Reynolds & Richmond, 1985). 
 
 
 
Results  
 
Exploratory Factor Analysis  
 
Exploratory factor analysis was conducted on the four versions of the CAWS to ascertain 
whether the items in the different versions consistently loaded on the same physical and 
social factors. In each case a scree plot test indicated that a two-factor solution provided the 
best description of the data. Table 1 shows the eigenvalues and percentage variance for the 
two factors by the three-wording adaptations. 
 
Using varimax rotations, with the criterion of 0.4 for loading on a factor with a loading of less 
than 0.3 on the alternate factor, items were examined to see their consistency of loading on 
the physical and social factor across the four adaptations of the scale. For the outcome scales 
all items loaded on the same factors across both versions of the CAWS. For the aversive 
wording of the stimulus scale, the items “were not invited to a birthday party” and “be alone” 
loaded on both factors, while the item “ride in a car” loaded weakly on the social factor. For 
the frequency of thought wording of the stimulus scale, again the item “ride in a car” loaded 
on the social scale while ”start at a new school” and “sing a song in front of friends” loaded on 
both factors. Overall, however, there was considerable support in the factor structure in the 
consistency of items loading on the same factor across the different versions. It was decided 
therefore to retain the 20 items for comparison purposes.  
 
Table 1 
Factorial Structure for the Four Versions of the CAWS 
 
 Factor 1 
Physical 
No 
 
 
Eigen 
 
 
% 
Factor 2 
Social 
No of 
Items 
 
 
Eigen 
 
 
% 
Total 
 
No of 
items 
 
 
% 
Aversive 
Outcomes 
 
  
164 
 
6.0 
 
29.9 
 
 
9 
 
3.2 
 
16.1 
 
11 
 
45.9 
Frequency 
of 
Thought 
Outcomes 
 
 
 
164 
 
 
6.8 
 
 
33.7 
 
 
9 
 
 
2.9 
 
 
14.7 
 
 
11 
 
 
48.5 
Aversive 
Stimuli 
 
 
164 
 
4.3 
 
21.6 
 
8 
 
3.0 
 
14.7 
 
9 
 
36.4 
Frequency 
of 
Thought 
Stimuli 
 
 
 
164 
 
 
4.4 
 
 
22.1 
 
 
8 
 
 
2.6 
 
 
12.9 
 
 
9 
 
 
35.0 
 
 
Reliability  
Cronbach’s coefficient alphas were derived for the four versions of the Child and Adolescent 
Worry Scale (CAWS). Coefficient alphas for the physical scales and the social scales for each 
of the versions were also calculated. Table 2 presents the internal consistency estimates for 
the entire sample by clinical group. The overall coefficient alphas for the aversiveness and 
frequency of thought outcomes scales were .87 and .89 respectively, while for the 
aversiveness and frequency of thought stimulus scales they were .79 and .81. 
 
  
Table 2 
Cronbach’s Coefficient Alphas for the Aversiveness Outcomes, Frequency of Thought 
Outcomes, Aversiveness Stimuli, and Frequency of Thought Stimuli Scales by Anxiety Group.   
 
  Physical Scale Social Scale Total Scale 
Aversive 
Outcomes 
 
Total Sample 
Anxious 
Non-anxious 
 
 
.85 
.91 
.72 
 
.87 
.89 
.83 
 
.87 
.90 
.82 
Frequency of 
Thought 
Outcomes 
 
Total Sample 
Anxious 
Non-anxious 
 
.87 
.88 
.85 
 
.88 
.88 
.88 
 
.89 
.89 
.89 
 
Aversive Stimuli  
Total Sample 
Anxious 
Non-anxious 
 
.73 
.78 
.66 
 
.81 
.82 
.76 
 
.79 
.84 
.74 
 
Frequency of 
Thought Stimuli 
 
Total Sample 
Anxious 
Non-anxious 
 
 
.74 
.74 
.77 
 
 
.76 
.81 
.68 
 
.81 
.85 
.76 
 
To examine for any age differences the samples were divided into two groups of children, 
under 10 years old and over 10 years old. Children’s responses to the four versions of the 
CAWS were analysed by a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with clinical group 
(anxious vs. nonanxious) and age group (under 10 years vs. over 10 years) as between 
subject factors. Age group was found to be not significant either as a main effect, Pillais 
F(4,157)=1.14, n.s. or in the interaction with clinical group, Pillias F (4,157)=0.29, n.s. 
However there was a multivariate clinical group difference, Pillias F (4,157)=5.44, p<..001). 
On examining the univariate F tests for outcome and stimulus measures, there was no 
significant differences between anxious and non-anxious subjects for the aversiveness 
wording outcome measure, F (1,162)=1.38, n.s., the aversiveness wording stimulus measure, 
F (1,162)=2.21, n.s., or the frequency of thought stimulus wording measure, F (1, 162)=0.89, 
n.s. However there was a significant difference between anxious and non-anxious children on 
the frequency of thought outcome measure. F (1,162)=6.79, p<.05 (see Table 3). An ANOVA 
conducted on the RCMAS indicated that a significant difference between the two groups of 
anxious and non-anxious children F (1,162)=29.1, p<.0001). 
 
Table 3  
Means Scores on Self-Report Measures of Anxiety-Disordered and Non-Anxious Children 
(Social and Physical Items Combined) by Age 
 
 
  
Under 10 
Anxious 
Over 10 
 
Total 
 
Under 10 
Non-Anxious 
Over 10 
 
Total 
 
RCMAS 
 
 
14.85 
(6.89) 
 
 
14.49 
(5.88) 
 
14.64 
(6.30) 
 
9.44 
(5.73) 
 
9.26 
(6.40) 
 
9.34 
 (6.60)*** 
Aversive 
Outcomes 
 
 
24.54 
(8.95) 
 
 
24.62 
(8.27) 
 
24.59 
(8.52) 
 
24.23 
(6.87) 
 
22.30 
(5.38) 
 
23.22 
(6.17) 
Aversive 
Stimuli 
 
 
16.97 
(7.68) 
 
 
16.55 
(7.15) 
 
16.73 
(7.33) 
 
16.03 
(5.44) 
 
14.53 
(5.18) 
 
15.24 
(5.32) 
Frequency 
of Thought 
 
 
13.71 
(6.67) 
 
15.38 
(8.84) 
 
 
14.67 
(7.98) 
 
10.92 
(7.04) 
 
12.12 
(7.96) 
 
11.55 
 (7.35)* 
Frequency 
of Outcomes 
Thought 
Stimuli 
 
 
12.54 
(6.77) 
 
12.36 
(6.91) 
 
12.44 
(6.81) 
 
13.18 
(5.41) 
 
13.51 
(5.69) 
 
13.35 
(5.53) 
*p<.05   ***p<.0001 
 
In order to examine more specific differences between the groups, the physical and social 
subscales of the various measures were subjected to univariate F tests with age group and 
clinical group as between subject factors. Significant differences were only found between 
anxious and non-anxious groups on aversiveness wordings of social outcomes, F 1,160) 
=4.54, p<.05 and frequency of thought wordings of physical outcomes, F(1,160)=6.26, p<.05. 
That is, anxious children rated negative social outcomes, such as being lonely or being 
embarrassed as more aversive than non-anxious children. Anxious children also reported that 
they thought more about negative physical outcomes such as dying or breaking a leg than 
non-anxious children. There was a trend towards significance for frequency of thought for 
social outcomes, F (1,160) =3.08, p=.081, with anxious children reporting that they tended to 
think more often about negative social outcomes than their non-anxious peers. Significant 
differences were also found on the aversiveness wording for physical stimulus items between 
the anxious and non-anxious groups, F (1,160)=5.20, p<.05, and aversiveness ratings of 
social stimulus items, F (1,160)=17.91, p<.0001. Thus non-anxious children rated negative 
physical stimuli such as fire and being in a war as being more aversive than did anxious 
children. However anxious children rated negative social stimuli such as giving a talk to class 
as significantly more aversive than non-anxious children. There were no significant 
differences between the aversiveness rating for physical outcomes, F (1,160) =0.58, n.s. or 
the frequency of thought ratings for either physical, F (1,160) =0.11, n.s. or social, F (1,160) 
=3.10, n.s. stimulus items. That is, all children rated negative physical outcomes such as 
dying as bad and there were no differences between anxious and non-anxious children in 
how often they thought about negative physical or social stimuli (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4  
Means of Physical and Social Outcome and Stimuli Measures of Anxious and Non-Anxious 
Children by Age 
 
  
 
<10 
Anxious 
 
>10 
 
 
Total 
 
 
<10 
Non-Anxious 
 
>10 
 
 
Total 
Physical 
Aversive 
Outcomes 
 
15.00 
(4.26) 
 
13.85 
(4.62) 
 
 
14.34 
(4.48) 
 
 
15.31 
(2.74) 
 
14.44 
(3.00) 
 
14.85 
(2.89) 
Social 
Aversive 
Outcomes 
 
 
9.54 
(6.17) 
 
 
10.77 
(5.44) 
 
10.24 
(5.76) 
 
8.92 
(5.31) 
 
7.86 
(4.09) 
 
8.37 
 (4.71)* 
Physical 
Frequency 
of Thought 
Outcomes 
 
 
5.17 
(3.91) 
 
6.02 
(4.83) 
 
5.66 
(4.46) 
 
3.56 
(3.55) 
 
4.35 
(4.12) 
 
3.98 
 (3.86)* 
Social 
Frequency 
of Thought 
Outcomes 
 
 
8.54 
(4.48) 
 
9.36 
(5.69) 
 
9.01 
(5.19) 
 
7.36 
(4.34) 
 
7.77 
(5.28) 
 
7.57 
(4.83) 
Physical 
Aversive 
Stimuli 
 
 
10.46 
(4.02) 
 
9.69 
(4.11) 
 
9.96 
(4.07) 
 
11.67 
(3.73) 
 
11.05 
(2.90) 
 
11.34 
 (3.32)* 
Social 
Aversive 
Stimuli 
 
 
6.51 
(5.8) 
 
6.96 
(4.66) 
 
6.77 
(4.82) 
 
4.36 
(3.71) 
 
3.49 
(3.32) 
 
3.90 
  (3.52)** 
Physical 
Frequency 
of Thought 
Stimuli 
 
 
5.57 
(3.35) 
 
5.00 
(3.59) 
 
5.24 
(3.48) 
 
4.41 
(3.31) 
 
5.79 
(3.84) 
 
5.13 
(3.64) 
Social 
Frequency 
of Thought 
Stimuli 
 
 
6.17 
(4.23) 
 
6.77 
(4.12) 
 
6.51 
(4.16) 
 
7.31 
(3.17) 
 
6.28 
(2.65) 
 
6.77 
(2.94) 
*p<.05   **p<.0001  
 
Age was not included in the following analyses as no differences were found in the previous 
analyses. A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) for the four measures showed there 
were no significant differences overall between the different anxiety disorders of Separation 
Anxiety, Social Phobia, Generalized Anxiety Disorder and Specific Phobia/Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder, Pillais F (12,231)=0.168, n.s. (see Table 5).  
 
Table 5 
Mean Scores of Different Anxiety-Disordered Children on Total CAWS Scores  
 
Principal 
Diagnosis 
Aversive 
outcomes 
Frequency of 
Thought 
outcomes 
Aversive Stimuli Frequency of 
Thought stimuli 
 
Separation 
Anxiety Disorder 
(25) 
 
 
24.84 
(7.34) 
 
12.80 
(6.85) 
 
16.12 
(5.82) 
 
9.72 
(5.96) 
 
Social Phobia 
(29) 
  
 
23.21 
(9.16) 
 
 
23.21 
(9.60) 
 
16.86 
(8.76) 
 
13.38 
(7.57) 
 
Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder 
(18) 
 
 
25.67 
(9.29) 
 
14.78 
(6.35) 
 
18.06 
(7.64) 
 
13.61 
(6.67) 
Simple Phobia & 
Obsessive 
Compulsive 
Disorder (10) 
 
 
26.00 
(8.60) 
 
16.90 
(8.24) 
 
15.50 
(6.19) 
 
14.40 
(5.48) 
 
One-way ANOVAs for each of the physical scales showed no differences between the anxiety 
disorders groups, physical aversiveness outcomes, F (3,78) = 0.297, n.s., physical frequency 
of thought outcomes, F (3,78) = 0.373, n.s., physical aversiveness stimuli F (3,78) = 0.163, 
n.s., physical frequency of thought stimuli, F (3,78) =0.776. No differences were found on any 
of the social scales either: social aversiveness outcomes, F (3,78) = 0.370, n.s., social 
frequency of thought outcomes, , F (3,78) = 0.803, n.s., social aversiveness stimuli, , F (3,78) 
= 0.652, n.s., social frequency of thought stimuli, , F (3,78) = 2.273, n.s. There was also no 
overall significant difference between the anxiety disorders on the physical or social 
subscales Pillais F (24,219)=0.848, n.s. (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6 
Mean Scores of Different Anxiety-Disordered Children on Physical and Social Subscales 
 
   Outcome Items  Stimuli Items  
Primary 
Diagnosis 
Phys 
aver 
outcome
Social 
aver 
outcome 
Phys 
thought 
outcome 
Social 
thought 
outcome
Phys 
avers 
stimuli 
Social 
avers  
stimuli 
Phys 
thought 
stimuli 
Social 
thought 
Stimuli 
 
SAD (25) 14.6 
(3.48) 
10.24 
(5.64) 
5.00 
(3.65) 
7.80 
(5.15) 
10.24 
(3.23) 
5.88 
(3.96) 
5.46 
(4.56) 
4.80 
(3.40) 
 
Social 
Phobia 
(29)  
 
 
13.72 
(4.98) 
 
9.48 
(5.69) 
 
5.72 
(5.36) 
 
9.72 
(5.76) 
 
9.79 
(4.67) 
 
7.07 
(5.49) 
 
5.17 
(3.86) 
 
7.55 
(4.44) 
GAD (18) 
 
14.89 
(4.56) 
10.78 
(6.51) 
5.89 
(3.55) 
8.89 
(4.30) 
10.22 
(4.25) 
7.83 
(5.42) 
5.67 
(2.89) 
7.17 
(4.31) 
 
SP & 
OCD (10) 
14.50 
(5.48) 
11.50 
(5.38) 
6.70 
(5.23) 
10.20 
(5.14) 
9.30 
(4.24) 
6.20 
(4.05) 
6.40 
(3.57) 
6.60 
(3.95) 
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The results showed that a measure that assessed the frequency with which children think 
about aversive outcomes produced significantly higher ratings from anxious children 
compared to non-anxious children, while the total score on a measure that assessed the 
frequency with which children think about aversive stimuli did not. Neither measure that 
assessed how bad children considered aversive outcomes and aversive stimuli produced 
significantly different results for the anxious and non-anxious subjects. These results support 
recent cognitive models of anxiety that stress the importance of representations of expected 
outcomes. The results also support Stattin’s (1984) contention that children have difficulty 
conceptualizing possible outcomes from a threatening stimulus situation and thus are 
probably more accurate in reporting their worry when the expected outcomes are clearly 
spelled out. These results for the frequency of thought outcomes equate with adult 
conceptions of worry about negative outcomes. 
 
However, further analysis of the results in terms of physical and social fear dimensions, 
indicated that not only did the wording of questionnaires (i.e., frequency of thought or 
aversiveness) affect children’s reports of anxiety, but also that the physical and social 
subscales showed different patterns between anxious and non-anxious children. The scores 
on the subscale measuring the aversiveness of physical outcomes, as predicted, were similar 
for both the anxious and non-anxious children. That is, all children regarded negative physical 
outcomes as aversive. However, also as predicted, anxious children reported thinking more 
frequently about negative physical outcomes than did non-anxious children. For the subscale 
assessing the frequency with which children think about negative social outcomes, again as 
hypothesized, there was no significant differences between anxious and non-anxious subjects 
(although there was a trend for anxious children to think more about negative social 
outcomes). In contrast, there was a significant difference between anxious and non-anxious 
children in how aversive they considered negative social outcomes to be. That is, anxiety-
disordered children rated negative social outcomes as more aversive than did non-anxious 
children. 
 
These results show an interesting pattern distinguishing anxious and non-anxious children. 
This pattern involves a distinction between social and physical concerns and also a distinction 
between how often children think about the outcome and how bad they consider it to be. As 
McNally and Foa (1987) have shown, anxious adults exaggerate the cost of unpleasant 
events as well as exaggerating the likelihood of their occurrence. This bias seems also to 
operate with anxious children with respect to physical and social outcomes. 
 
These patterns of results for physical and social outcome scales were not repeated for the 
stimulus measure. There was no difference in the frequency of thought ratings for either 
physical or social stimuli between anxious and non-anxious children. These results are similar 
to other findings using stimulus measures that have failed to distinguish between anxious and 
non-anxious children (Perrin & Last, 1992). However the aversiveness ratings for the stimulus 
measures did not show a difference between the groups. The social stimuli aversiveness 
ratings mirrored the results of the social aversiveness outcome measures. That is, anxious 
children reported negative social stimuli, such as not being invited to a birthday party, getting 
the results of a test back or giving a talk to the class as significantly more aversive than non-
anxious children. However, on the aversiveness of physical stimuli, although there was a 
difference between anxious and non-anxious children, it was in the unexpected direction. That 
is, non-anxious children reported the physical stimuli such as being in a fire, being in a war, or 
having AIDS, to be more aversive than did the anxious children. This seems to be contrary to 
theoretical expectations that anxious children would show an exaggerated perception of 
threat. This pattern is particularly difficult to explain as this effect was not found for negative 
social stimulus items. Perhaps the negative social stimuli were considered so aversive by the 
anxious children that the negative physical stimuli paled into insignificance beside them. 
Further research is required to see why this pattern occurred. 
 
None of the four measures discriminated between the different childhood anxiety disorders. 
One reason for the lack of discriminant validity for any of the measures between the different 
anxiety disorders could be that anxiety disorders in children are characterized by high levels 
of co-morbidity and lack of specificity. It is more likely that a general negative affectivity is 
more prevalent across all anxiety disorders than peculiar to a particular childhood anxiety 
disorder. Over half of the anxious subjects in the study were diagnosed with two or more 
concurrent anxiety disorders. Often children diagnosed with Separation Anxiety Disorder, 
hypothesized to be more concerned with physical threat, were also diagnosed with Social 
Phobia, hypothesized to be more concerned with social threat. It is a limitation in this study 
that so many children had concurrent different anxiety disorders which limited the sample size 
for each category. Further research with children with only one anxiety diagnosis could show 
different results. However these results seem to indicate that fear structures in children do not 
appear to be as clearly differentiated as they are in adults. 
 
The present study thus demonstrates that both the cost of unpleasant events as well as the 
frequency of thought about unpleasant events are valuable in determining anxiety in children 
be self-report methods. The results also demonstrate the importance of social concerns for 
children. This is contrary to other findings (Ollendick, 1983, 1987; Slee & Cross, 1989), which 
show that children are more concerned about physical threat than social threat. The findings 
of the present study, however, seem to suggest that social concerns more clearly differentiate 
between anxious and non-anxious children. 
 
In summary, some implications for self-report data for identifying anxious children are that 
perhaps child-based and not adult adapted scales are more useful, together with the inclusion 
of both outcome and stimulus items in different subscales. Further, it is important to 
distinguish between social and physical concerns when asking children about their worries. In 
addition, it is important to investigate both the frequency of thought or worry about unpleasant 
events as well as the perceived cost or aversiveness of these events to accurately distinguish 
between anxious and non-anxious children, using self-report data. 
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